

Public Opinion Research on corruption



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This study was made possible with the support of the American people through the U.S. Agency for International Development, specifically through its Good Governance Activity in Montenegro. The author's views expressed in this study do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government."

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CEDEM, May, 2011

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Basic elements of conceptual framework

'The problem of corruption is very visible problem in countries in transition'. This is generally known phrase that is part of political discourse of countries in transition, and therefore in Montenegro. The whole rhetoric about corruption is, actually, part of analysis that are, in the most cases, based on assumption on the transformation of society, first from an institutional point of view, then demolition of value models of real-socialism, so as the

legislative problems, establishment and operation of new institutions. Therefore, we see corruption as pathological phenomenon that which fills the 'vacuum' between these two systems that are linearly alternating. Of course, what is very important in this terminology, corruption is expanding as a practice that is part of 'redistribution' of wealth and state property, or, in other words, it is part of so-called 'original accumulation of capital' in conditions of shifts from authoritarian to a democratic society, from socialist to capitalist, from statism to liberalism, etc.

Above-mentioned political, and in great part, scientific discourse has its justification, and to great extent can give basic analytical framework for understanding the problem of corruption for societies in transition. But this kind of discourse has a lot of substantial deficiencies and important questions. First, suggested explanatory framework is quite simplified by the fact that a large number of different countries are put on the same analytical plane, with no regard to very important characteristics of specific societies. Second, this framework legitimize corruption as necessary evil, functional substitute of system dysfunction, and in any way does not helps us to propose policies that would be in service of anti-corruption in particular circumstances, except 'to wait' for transition to be over, because apparently stems from this theoretical framework, establishing of new social system will itself lead to reduction of corruption. Third, thesis about 'duration of transition' is really prosaic. Namely, to speak today about transition is anachronistic. Transition (or social transformation, as sociologists say) is moving of society from point A to point B. Logically, transition is ending by getting to the point B. But, today, after more than 20 years of this process, we still speak that we are in transformation. The question is how long that transformation will last? What are the conditions that needs to be/should be fulfilled so we could say that transition is over? What is left to be 'transformed' so we could say it is end of transition? In its analysis, Szeleny (1998) has a point when says that transition is over a couple years ago. That society in front of us is finished product of process of social transition. But, the fact that society in which we live is not completely like societies that are 'marked' as point B, is a different problem. Actually, we could not expect that as a result of transition, we will have Montenegro as true copy of any country with long democratic tradition, and this also refers to other countries in region. True copying was possible, but in those cases it was only partially achieved, when it comes about countries that had civic tradition before socialism (like Czech Republic). The problem is not in facts; it is in political perception of those facts. Therefore, fully justified theoretical thesis is that the process of transition is over, and that result is in front of us, the society we live in, the society that have many flaws and it is far from perfection. That is post-transitional society, or society of post-socialistic capitalism (Buroway, 2001), or so-called society of 'imperfect democracy' (Szeleny, 1999).

But particular problem is not scientific, but political discourse that constantly use thesis of 'society in transition'. It is showed that this discourse, as political, means public, very functional, for almost all actors. First, for government representatives, it is excuse for all failures, bad political situation, lack of functioning of institutions, missing of law

enforcement, etc. Second, this discourse is suitable as part of opposition criticism with argument that 'they' (opposition) would faster and more efficient 'finish' transition, although nobody understand when is going to happen the end of transition. Third, international community and external political actors skillfully use the discourse of transition to justify their own importance and role in process of transformation of each country that is in transitional period, but actually with aim to shape those countries according to their needs. This should not be judgment, just ascertain, since the transition is in the era of globalization, where the power is manifested and demonstrated in relation 'center-periphery' (Lazić, 2002). Further, there are other actors that have some benefit from transitional discourse. They are NGO's, for example, who, with their activities, become key propagators of 'new ideology' that like any other ideology, build and establish its own myths as necessary, absolute and eternal truths. As a result, instead of socialistic myth of 'equality', we have capitalistic myth about 'freedom'. Instead of myth about 'brotherhood and unity', we have myth about 'human rights'. Instead of cult of 'worker', we have cult of 'entrepreneur', and so on. Sure that the interest of those who disseminate new ideology (means theology) to claim that society is still not transformed, and that there is still a lot to be done in that sense. In this way, they justify their own existence. Finally, in political discourse, there is latent repeating of the idea that the transition is ending by entering of certain country in EU. Therefore, in one covert way there is assumption that we are 'transforming' until we become the members of EU, and after that, the process ends, means we are finally reached the point B from point A. This idea, for now fits the actors we have mentioned above, with all the arguments we presented. But, absurdity of this interpretation should not be disputed, namely, it would mean that EU countries are static, that they are in some ideal state, and that once reached state, that we call 'EU state' by itself resolves all problems because it represent 'promised paradise'.

Therefore, we will start from the assumption that transition is completed. Problems should not be viewed and interpreted from the point of 'transforming society', but from the standpoint of society, we will call societies 'post-socialist capitalism'. Each of those societies has a series of specific, and its condition has very distinctive characteristics, regarding the number of factors that re-shaped that society in both, historical and current temporal intersection. Montenegro is one of those societies, and it will be necessary to make some analytical review on specific social context of Montenegrin society, so we could better understand specific problem that will be the subject of our research, the problem of corruption.

There are some key aspects we have to consider, if we want to deal with problem of corruption in Montenegro in right way. Regarding their significance, we will elaborate them individually in the following lines.

1. **Montenegro is 'small' country, from the aspect of population and territory** – This fact is very important from several reasons. First, the size of the country largely

determines its overall capacities. In other words, overall capacities of Montenegro as independent country are not so great, and when we say this, mainly we are talking about institutional and human capacities. Without institutional and human capacities, problems that need to be solved become more complex and more difficult for solving. Second, in small country practically there is no anonymity. When it comes about Montenegro, this is very present, because apart from small number of citizens, cultural factors also contribute to intense communication. In other words, there is no anonymity, and events in internal communication are transmitting 'before they happened', figuratively speaking. This ascertainment to great extent define specific micro-social climate, that is characterized in the network of interactions, and consequently is formed one specific, informal but influential public that hears the story, talk about it, try and judge. Third, in small country, with small capacities, with intense informal communication at all levels, it is relatively easy to impose certain topics, oversize their significance, and what is especially important, to provide a dominant interpretation of this topics, that are, of course, in the interest of interpreter. Fourth, small countries are increasingly sensitive to what is happening on the other side, rather, on what is happening in neighboring countries and to external-political pressures.

2. **In Montenegro, the ruling party has not changed since the beginning of the transition to the present** – This fact is especially important for understanding of large number of problems, including corruption. Stability and such a long survival of a party in power is a curiosity that from all countries in transition, only Montenegro can boast (we don't count Belarus, since transition hasn't started yet). The ruling party took power very strongly from the first day, driven by young and strong leaders, used all the resources of communist party from which it was created, and finally, self-define as only possible solution for the future of Montenegro. In its persistence, ruling party was successfully changing ideological matrixes, moving to the ideological extremes, from Serbian nationalism, to European neo-liberalism. Actually, ideology is not so important, for this party, namely, power as it is, and is its ideology. Government that persists so long caused several important consequences that are necessarily an integral part of our perspective. First, in this way is formed one more-less stabile staffing network consisting of officials, members, supporters and apparatchiks, which in an institutional practice, through one authoritarian model solve problems on a daily-political level, and for daily- political purposes. Second, long-lasting staff bonding also produces stabile long-lasting social networks, which often leads to devastation of the institutions and moving a process of decision-making from institutions on individuals that belong to the network. Third, stability of these social network, and that is particularly important for us, facilitates disseminations of those practices that have corrupted nature, namely, changing of social networks and its actors, like opposition, to impede corrupt practice. Fourth,

and last, political elite, reflected in ruling party, was directly implemented the process of social transformation, including privatization (means: original accumulation of capital), which additionally strain their position from the aspect of possibilities of corrupt practice.

3. **Montenegro has a status of independent country for only five years** – Until 2006. year, Montenegro was in federation with Serbia. In several state arrangements, from faithful companion of authentic Serbian politics, to aspiration for independence, Montenegro was largely self-determined its identity as negative comparing to Serbia. This fact from history invoked old models of division on Montenegrins and Serbs, traitors and patriots, traditionalists and modernists, liberals and conservatives, etc. All this divisions have bad influence on political stability of Montenegro and consequently are transferring to all strata of social life. These divisions are deep, and often are fundament of all other divisions. In other words, often, every topic, problem, discourse, argument actually ontologically can be lead under basic division, and problem itself, discourse, or argument become only excuse for 'jeopardizing' of opposite side. Therefore, in our context, corruption is often taken as platitude, means negatively connoting political argument, to attack government, where there is no real intention for dealing with problem of corruption. When, in this case, corruption is used in that way, as a excuse for 'deeper' political battles, that there is an exaggeration of this phenomenon, wrong interpretation, forgery, etc. (by this we don't want to justify the phenomenon of corruption). As consequence, occurs a change in the perception of citizens, and consequently the whole problem is additionally strain by layers of meanings that masks real picture of problem, and without real picture, there is no solution. On the other hand, defensive position of attacked side also do not deal with problems we are talking about, in our case, corruption, but politically defend on key front, authorities defense from 'enemy', so problems (mean: corruption)are additionally hiding, re-interpreting, diminishing, and negate.
4. **Cultural-historical specificities of Montenegro** – Every social problem, so as corruption, must be seen through prism of cultural-historical matrix of that society. To say that in this regard Montenegro is specific is tautology (namely, every country is specific), but certainly we must take into account that heritage and tradition of Montenegrin society, that reflects in still visible marks of tribal-Achaeon model of interpretation of identity, that brotherhood bonding and characteristics of the members of these collectivities, significantly determine nature of social relations, in both, institutional arrangement and non-institutional sense. Seems that this kind of heritage in great measure fits to intense and 'liable' communication when it comes about corrupt conduct.

Corruption: contextual, conceptual and operational issues

The problem of corruption is very well known problem in both, theory and real life of every society. So-called 'deterioration' is consequence of different factors in different conditions, occurs at different levels and has different consequences. Also, corruption is perceiving and interpreting differently from different actors. But, despite all this 'differences', corruption has certain common characteristics in each case that appears. First, and basic, corruption is significant cause of problem in 'normal' functioning of society. It blocks or aggravates functioning of institutions to that extent that can decrease the meaning of those institutions. Second, corruption is special problem due to the fact that in process of corruption participate at least two sides, the one who is corrupt and the one who corrupts, where both sides are winners. The loser is, of course, country, public interest, citizens themselves. Due to the fact that direct actors, means both sides that participates in corrupt practice, realize benefits, every country has a huge problem in fighting against corruption. Third, fight against corruption itself demand strengthening of the bureaucratic apparatuses, forming of special commissions, bodies, organizations, whereby the results of these commissions, bodies and organizations are very modest, regarding their costs (there are no explicit valid data in the world about cross-benefit of anti-corruptive bureaucracy, but the attitude about inefficiency is more-less always present). Fourth, corruption is by itself very ambiguous concept, means concept that implies different content, often those actions that are not corruptive. Fifth, and last, corruption, as something 'bad', is often used just as integral part of critical discourse, where the problem of corruption is transformed in interpretation frameworks of wider political battles, and to great extent can be explained by actors' motives that moves from political ambitions to financial benefits that are carried by fighting the corruption itself.

In this research, we have formed the operational concept of corruption, considering the reality. The very idea of research was not to assimilate into one of the many that was realized, so the need of bureaucratic ritualism would be satisfied someone's willingness to deal with corruption. Therefore, itself theoretical and methodological, and certainly operational framework adjusted to these needs. That the concept used in this research itself is understandable, we need to elaborate several aspects that are contextual and operational in the same time (joining the contextual and operational is actually idea for the draft policies based on results of research itself).

European commission is in its last (and in previous) Report about progress of Montenegro toward EU especially emphasized the problem of corruption and its solving (with problem of organized crime). Emphasizing of this problem is actually the result of general 'perception' that corruption is very present in Montenegro. Assessment of the degree of corruption in Montenegro has several reasons. First, it is a fact that this phenomenon is really present and that to a great extent reality was the one that influenced on 'perception'. However, to great extent, perception is the result of other processes that are not necessarily rooted in reality.

First, perception of corruption became an integral part of critical (partially political-oppositional) discourse that is not orientated only to corruption, but which that corruption use as an argument for fighting against government. Further, 'perception' is product of action of special NGO's and political actors, who also use corruption as one of important weapons in fight against 'irremovable government'. Further, 'perception' of corruption is result of need from certain foreign-policy circles to use this argument as mechanism for disciplining authority and its behavior, often with purpose to keep the authority in obedience, to be obedient when it comes about making some other decisions, important for this external political power centers. Finally, perception happens in very specific social-political and cultural- historical surroundings (we've described above) and which significantly contribute to strengthening of perception itself. As a result of all this factors, there is high degree of perception of corruption in Montenegro, and after perception itself strengthening the corruption, and so *ad infinitum*.

There is no doubt that corruption is present, and that perception of corruption is high. There are clear, unambiguous, empirical proven cases of 'big' corruption in Montenegro. In that regard, one organization (MANS) enclosed valid empirical evidence. When it comes about big corruption, we should bear in mind a few things. First, big corruption is relatively rare because it is 'big'. Second, when it comes about big corruption, every case is unique, almost unrepeatable. Due to that, based on analysis of those cases, it is not possible to understand the matrixes, principles, rules under which the corruption is spreading as social phenomenon, but it is just possible to process it (the fact that these cases are not prosecuted, s special problem, and explains a lot about political system itself). Third, big corruption to the great extent influence on overall perception, which is integral part of solution, but also the problem. Fourth, and key, in the life of citizens and within the normal functioning of society, besides big corruption, one more thing that is very important is corruption of 'lower level'. In other words, we need knowledge about common practices that in different aspects of social functioning provide corrupt practices. In short, that was assignment of our research. Actually, we want to deal with corruption as model of behavior, and institutional dysfunction that are covered by the corruption at the middle and lower level.

When it comes about perception, the problem is the most visible from epistemological standpoint. Namely, just 'perception', as we elaborated above, is resultant of large number of factors. The report *transparency international* for 2010 year shows high level of corruption in Montenegro. According to this report, in competition of 178 countries, Montenegro is on 69th place with index of 3.7. It is interesting that Montenegro share this place with Cuba and Brazil (it would be interesting to see what referent information are used for forming the Index on Cuba), but also with Romania, which is EU country. Montenegro is also before Bulgaria, which is relatively new member of EU, but significantly before Greece, old member of EU. If we see the data in this way, then the results is 'satisfying', namely, the assessment that corruption in Montenegro is on lower level than in some countries

members of EU, is very satisfactory, but this moment needs special analysis. First, INDEX is INDEX of perception of corruption, and not just corruption itself. Perception is not 'without face', namely, perception has to be someone's, not just perception. If it is about perception of citizens of Montenegro, there is no doubt that data can be problematic, namely, from comparative researches (EVS, SEESSP, ESS), we know that perception of citizens also in Romania, Bulgaria, and Greece (in Serbia, where is at lower level) is 'lower' than in Montenegro. Due to that there is question about whose perception is this about? Without any attention to criticize methodology of making INDEX, it is still important to say that INDEX is product of very free estimations, collecting of information from different sources, and trying to substitute the perception of citizens with assessment of the level of corruption. Second, researches within Montenegro (CEDEM) shows that perception of corruption from citizens is very high, and I repeat, higher than in large number of countries that have lower level of INDEX than Montenegro. Third, and key, when we measure perception, it is very important to understand that individuals have different position within perceptual field, so the active micro-social constellation, that in Montenegro needs to be seen from standpoint of original analysis in this work, is visible through a several factors that determine it.

But, when it comes about perception, it is important to keep in mind the feedback that we pointed out above. Namely, when it comes about the fight against corruption, it is important to say that fight against corruption alone, on way that it is showing in public can additionally increase the perception of corruption. In other words, if we speak about this topic without criticism and in general, that can bring to strengthening of perception of corruption itself (Rose-Akerman, 1998). But this is not the biggest problem, rather, much bigger problem is that strengthening of perception of corruption leads to legitimizing practice of corrupt conduct, rather, strengthening of perception itself, it can initiate change in behavioral models due to reasons that corrupt conducts are legitimized as 'usual'. This feedback is especially important and it should be on mind of all public policies, official appearances, researches, and other elements of discourse that are 'public' by its character. In other words, the fight against corruption is not just fight against behavioral patterns, but also fight against damage that wrong approaches of fight against corruption, with their different motives, necessarily produce.

When we were designing this research, we counted all these aspects. Apart from other researches, that become common, design of this research has several key distinctive characteristics. First, when we deal with perception, we will do that with methodological caution, looking at it from different angles, rather, we will not be interested only in perception, but also its origin, and interpretational framework, and within certain categories of examinees. Second, we will go one step further from perception, rather, we will try to identify patterns of behavior and practice that increase likelihood of corrupt conduct. Third, apart from general level of corruption research, in our research we are focused on several aspects and areas of social and economic life, with attention not to include 'whole' phenomenon of corruption, but to analyze deeper several areas in which we have

corruption. Fourth, the whole research is design explicitly, so based on research, we can suggest concrete measures and instruments, that will represent barriers against corruption in one functional way. Fifth, if we want to fulfill these goals, we have realized three researches, first, it is research about population's attitudes, second, the research about entrepreneurs' attitudes, and third, the research about judges attitudes. Sixth, and last, we used two different methods for the same goals, and that is survey method individual interview.

Finally, when it comes about operational concept of 'corruption, we defined corruption as behavioral pattern, or as types of behavior and practice of actors in corrupt actions. This approach is not typical for research about corruption, but we had good reasons to operationally define corruption. Essentially, the reason is simple and it concerns forming of public politics and prevention of corruption. Rather, we started from the assumption that corruption can be prevented if we understand the patterns of behavior of actors, by deciphering following:

- Situations that are characteristic for emerging of corrupt conduct
- Process of negotiation between actors in performing of corrupt actions
- Mechanisms that provide misapplication and produce corruption
- Dysfunction of institutions that open possibilities for corruption

According to that, we can define our operational concept of corruption as **those types of behavior that generates in typical situations, and results in corrupt actions in certain process of negotiation between actors, and that happens due to activation of certain mechanisms that provide misapplication, due to dysfunction of institutions of the society.**

Confidence in institutions and experiences with institutions


First aspect of research was dedicated to measuring of confidence in institutions. Significance of this question reflects in the fact that relation toward institutions in great measure determines the behavior of individuals toward institutions and toward wider social life. On the other hand, based on transition theory, we know that in post-transitional societies institutions do not have that strength, capacities and routine, as it was the case with traditional democratic states. In the light of our understanding of corruption, in the later part of report, we will analyze relation toward corruption in the light of confidence in institutions. Here, however, for the beginning, we present results of measuring of

confidence in institutions (Fig 1 and Fig 2). **The results of research show that citizens have the highest degree of confidence in Church, means religious confession (not SPC or CPC, but confession in general). Then there is system of education, health system, and the president of Montenegro. High value (over 50% of confidence) we measure when it comes about NGOs and prime minister.** In the middle echelon, with approximate values we measure confidence in police, press, ministries, army, local self-government, public administration and judiciary. The lowest degree of confidence we measure when it comes about parliament of Montenegro, big companies, and political parties. It is good to say that measured values can be qualified as 'very solid', rather, we could not say that citizens of Montenegro have confidence in institutions. The thing that is **analytically interesting is high value of confidence in NGOs.** This point out that NGOs have significant place in social and political life of Montenegro, and that in great measure represents functional substitute for dysfunctions of system.

Fig 1. Confidence in institutions %

	Has great confidence	Mostly has confidence	Mostly don't have confidence	Do not have confidence at all	No opinion about it
1. Prime minister	19,0	32,6	15,5	15,2	17,8
2. Ministries	10,2	34,6	23,1	18,2	13,8
3. President of Montenegro	22,5	34,0	17,3	14,9	11,2
4. Public services	10,1	33,5	24,2	17,5	14,7
4. Parliament of Montenegro	8,7	28,1	23,6	25,4	14,2
5. Judiciary	8,4	34,4	24,7	20,2	12,3
6. Police	10,8	37,0	22,0	18,6	11,5
8. Local authorities	12,3	32,4	22,6	19,7	13,0
7. Church, religious confession	43,2	26,7	6,9	8,5	14,6
8. Press (Media)	8,3	39,4	26,8	13,4	12,0
9. Army	12,8	32,7	16,0	15,8	22,7
10. Political parties	5,5	21,2	23,9	32,4	17,1
11. Health system	13,4	46,1	17,4	14,5	8,5
12. Educational system	14,9	47,2	16,1	10,7	11,2
13. Big companies	7,1	20,8	19,5	26,1	26,5
14. NGOs	18,5	35,5	11,7	12,9	21,4

Fig 2. Confidence in institutions – the sum has great and mostly has confidence %



Especially important question in our research was about experiences that citizens have with institutions of the system. This is from many reasons; first, we wanted to see how much citizens have contact with institutions that were subject of our interest. Second, we wanted to see in what shapes that experience is showing for each institution that was subject to our interest. Third, we wanted to measure satisfaction of citizens in contact with these institutions. Fourth, the idea was to determine the way of communication between citizens and institutions, especially in this regard, to determine the degree of transparency of institutions by experiences of citizens. Finally, we wanted to use the data about experience as one of criteria for assessment of corruption, and we will show this in the part of report that explicitly deals with corruption.

First, when it comes about ministries, the results show that 15% of citizens in the last two years had experience with one or more ministries (Fig 3). That means that, when it comes about o efficiency of ministries, **when they express confidence in ministries, when they assess the level of corruption in these ministries, citizens do that based on personal contacts with ministries.** By analysis of the results with which ministries citizens had contact, (Fig 4), we discover that **the biggest number of citizens had experiences with ministry of agriculture, ministry of education, and ministry of work and social care, ministry of internal affairs, ministry of tourism and ministry of finance.** In other words, these are the most significant ministries, when it comes about contact between citizens and ministries, and we should pay special attention to these ministries, to improve communication and citizens' perception of work of ministries.

Fig 3. In the last two years, did you or members of your family had experience with some ministry?






Fig 4. With which ministry you had experience -% of those who had experience with ministries



Note: the names of ministries are given authentically as respondents named them


When it comes about experience of contact with ministries (Fig 5) the biggest number of citizens (1/3) was in contact with ministry doing some administrative work (issue of permits, applications, requirements, etc). However, almost equally (less than every fifth citizen from those that had contact with ministries) had experience that looks like: requirements for loans and other financial support, business communication and complaints/objections for special rights. According to that, these are **the most common types of communication with ministries that we should pay special attention, when it comes about prevention of corruption.**

Fig 5. Experience with ministries



When it comes about communication with ministries, important is every question about transparency, and within it very concept of transparency, one of the most important aspects in question are citizens, in resolving their problems with ministries, and their insight in procedures and ways of solving those cases (Fig 6). The results of research points out that large number of citizens had insight, comparing to those that did not have insight. In total, to a greater or lesser extent, almost 2/3 of citizens had insight into procedures, while something over 1/3 claims they did not have insight.

Fig 6. Did you have insight into procedures and the way Ministry solved your case?



Further, citizens assessed efficiency of ministries they had contact in the last two years (Fig 7). And when it comes about efficiency, the results points out that there is discrepancy in

attitudes of citizens, namely, over 54% of citizens cumulatively show satisfaction about efficiency of ministries, while less than 46% is not satisfied with efficiency. So, it is obvious that in this regard, we need to make certain progress. Further, if we look at data about efficiency of ministry, considering the type of experience citizens had (Fig 8), we can see that 2/3 of citizens are satisfied when it comes about administrative services of ministries, requirements about financing and crediting. Smaller number of citizens (below the half) is satisfied with efficiency, when it comes business communication, and the smallest (1/3) when it comes about ways in which ministries solved their objections and complaints.

Fig 7. How would you assess the speed and efficiency of ministries in concrete case?






Fig 8. Assessment of efficiency of ministries regarding the type of communication with ministries – SUM mostly and very satisfied



But it was very important to examine the reasons for dissatisfaction of citizens when it comes about ministries (Fig 9). The largest number of citizens (37%) as reason of dissatisfaction brings up slowness, laziness, tardiness, sloppiness and arbitrariness. This is actually **key aspect when it comes about promotion of work of ministries**. Simply, citizens negatively rate the speed of resolving their case, and the reason for inefficiency they see the problem in behavior of officials in ministries. Second reason for inefficiency, according to citizens, is their attitude that when it comes about their case, there is some problem of corruption, bribe and nepotism, but almost equally is present the problem of incompetency, irresponsibility and unprofessionalism. As reason for inefficiency, in significantly lower percent, there is political incorrectness and political discrimination.

Fig 9. The reasons for dissatisfaction of inefficiency of ministries



Next institution that was subject of our interest by identical methodological pattern was judiciary. Just as ministries, we also wanted to identify experiences of respondents when it comes about contact with courts. The data shows that 16% of citizens (or members of their family) had experience with one or several courts (Fig 10). This number of cases gives us solid base to analyze experiences of those that had contact with court. Further, when it comes about experiences the largest number of respondents had experience with basic courts (Fig 11), so because of that, in further analysis we describe cases of contact with basic courts.

Fig 10. In the last two years did you or members of your family had experience with some court?






Fig 11. The court that respondents had experience %




When it comes about assessment of transparency of work of courts, (Fig 12), based on assessment of respondents, in total, 2/3 is more-less satisfied with insight in procedures and ways in which their case was resolved in court, while 1/3 express dissatisfaction in this regard.

Fig 12. Did you have insight into procedures and ways that court resolved your case? %




On the other side, when it comes about efficiency (Fig 13), assessment of citizens are divided, so opposite to almost 53% of those that points out that work of courts was in their case more-less efficient, there is over 47% of those that are not satisfied with efficiency. So, the same as with ministries, efficiency is significantly expressed problem comparing to transparency.

Fig 13. How would you assess the speed and efficiency of court in concrete case %




The key reasons for dissatisfaction of work of courts are assessment of respondent that officials are slow, tardy, careless arbitrary (Fig 14). So, they are the same reasons just as when it comes about ministries, and what is analytically important is that citizens are complains on 'human factor'. Every fifth citizen has objection on work of court due to his-her assessment that it is about corruption, and almost 17% are complains on incompetence, irresponsibility and unprofessionalism. Almost ever tenth respondent, who efficiency of courts assesses as negative, complains on political discrimination and political incapacity.

Fig 14. The reasons for inefficiency of courts




Third sector that was subject of our interest in initial part of the research is local governance. First, we determined that 12% of respondents or members of their families had experience with some organ of local governance (Fig 15).

Fig 15. Did you or member of your family in the last two years had some experience with organs of local authority?




When it comes about transparency of work of municipal services, over 72% of citizens points out that they had insight in procedures and ways their case was solved, while less than 28% points out that they didn't have insight (Fig 16). This data show that, based on experiences of citizens, municipal services are more transparent comparing to judiciary and ministries.

Fig 16. Did you had insight in procedures and ways municipal resolved your case? %




Further, when it comes about efficiency of municipal services, the largest number of respondent (43%) evaluates that services are mostly efficient, and cumulative with assessment of highest degree of efficiency, satisfaction in this regard express over 55% of citizens, while on the other side, the fact that municipal services are more-less inefficient points out almost 45% of respondents (Fig 18).

Fig 17 .How would you assess the speed and efficiency of municipal services in concrete case?
%



As reasons for inefficiency, citizens, in this case too, talk about their slowness, tardiness, careless and arbitrary of officials (38,2%). So, when it comes about municipal services, human factor, rather, behavior and lack of motivation of officials, according to attitudes of respondents, is unfavorable professional capability of officials (28.8%), while corruption, bribe and nepotism, as reasons, brings up every fifth respondent. Political incompetency and political discrimination is the reason for inefficiency for only 6,6% respondents (Fig 18).

Fig 18. The reasons of inefficiency of municipal services




Political participation and activism

The next segment of research was dedicated to key aspects of political participation and activism. The aim was to measure the degree and way in which citizens are involved in certain practice related to political life, to measure their knowledge, to determine their action potential.


First, when it comes about interest of citizens for politics and political issues (Fig 19), opposite to stereotypes and common sense that interest for politics in Montenegro is very high, our data points out that it is very moderate. Rather, every third citizen is partially interested, and less than every tenth citizen is very interested. On the other side, less than third is not interested at all (this data matches the average election abstinance) while more than quarter of citizens is 'not so interested'.

Fig 19 How much are you interested in politics? %




When it comes about political knowledge (Fig 20), we can see that key channel that citizens use to get information is TV, then newspapers. It is interesting that internet is more important channel for information than radio. More than every fourth citizen regularly or often use internet for information, which leaves enough space for exploitation of this channel when it comes about informing of citizens.

Fig 20. How often do you follow socio-political events on: %




When it comes about confidence (Fig 21), we can see that citizens have confidence in information they get from media, and differences in this regard between the types of media are not that expressed, except when it comes about internet. Only when it comes about internet, over 41% of citizens have no confidence, which is positive data, considering the fact that internet as media provide dissemination without any control of unreliable and inaccurate information.

Fig 21. How much do you trust in information you get from: %




When it comes about political activism, separately we measured 'unconventional political participation' (Fig 22). The results points out that citizens are, in this regard, really or potentially the most active when it comes about signing petition. Further when it comes about participation in legal demonstrations and boycotts, we measure solid level of readiness for these types of action. High potential in regard of readiness citizens also express when it comes about searching protection from authorities, by complaints to NGOs and media. Relatively low potential of unconventional political participation we measure when it comes about taking over the buildings and factories and illegal boycotts.

Fig 22. Would you or you wouldn't participate in following types of political action %




Special question in our research, when it comes about socio-political activism, was about practice/readiness for citizens to submit an appeal in situation they think their interests are endangered (Fig 23). In this regard, results are very satisfactory, namely, every tenth citizen is not ready to submit an appeal, in other words, seems like citizens are ready to fight for their personal interests.

Fig 23. Would you submit the appeal if your interests are endangered? %




Further, we wanted to identify reasons why citizens with endangered rights would not submit the complaint (Fig 24). There are two key reasons in this regard, first, that is mistrust in judiciary and other institutions, and the second is very interesting because they bring up personal reasons. This category is actually sum of attitudes that are culturally, and goes from pseudo-Christian argumentations to character self-identities.

Fig 24. The reasons for not submitting the complaint %




Finally, in this part of research we explored readiness of citizens to use the Law of free information access, to protect their interests (Fig 25). In this regard, relatively small number of citizens shows readiness to do that (Fig 25).

Fig 25. Would you ever apply to some of the state authorities on the basis of the law of free information access? %



From those who would not do that (Fig 26), as key reasons they mention 'personal reasons' almost identical in descriptive meaning we already mention (I am not that kind of man, I do not want to sue, I am religious, etc.). The second by importance is the lack of confidence in institutions of society. Third reason is lack of knowledge of citizens when it comes about information, rather, they do not know to whom to submit the appeal. Here certainly exists the space for affirmative action.

Fig 26. If you would not apply for free information access, what are the reasons for that? %




Attitudes about judiciary and judges

Attitudes of citizens about judiciary and judges were special segment of this research. In this regard, we were focused on several key aspects that are important for both, measuring attitudes of citizens and factors that eventually generate attitudes. Attitudes about judiciary were especially important from two key reasons. First, judiciary and efficiency of laws enforcement are cornerstone legal state and basic condition of efficiency of fight against social pathological phenomena, so as the corruption. Second, in general political debate, and based on reports and information that are written on this subject from several different institutions and individuals, the condition in courts is assessed as bad in general, and there is attitude that is very important to make step forward in this regard.

In this research first we measured general attitude of citizens about judiciary (Fig 27). More than every second mostly have positive attitude in this regard. On the other side, more than every third citizen have mostly negative attitude. However, on the extremes, every tenth have very negative attitude in opposition to every twentieth that have very positive attitude.


According to that, attitudes are divided, and relatively big are number of citizens that more-less have negative attitude about judiciary.

Fig 27. When it comes bout judiciary in Montenrgro, you would say that your attitude is: %




When it comes about assessment of judiciry (Fig 28), attitudes are also divided, opposed to those 52% that assess judiciary as more-less efficient, there is almost 48% of those who think that judiciary is more-less inefficient, with every tenth citizen who shows the highest level of dissatisfaction with inefficiency of judiciary.

Fig 28. How would you assess the efficiency of judiciary in Montenegro? %



Especially important was the question of assessment of citizens about work of judges, rather, their assessment do whether judges work under the legislation or some other criteria (Fig 29). Only every twentieth citizen think that judges work under the legislation, with over 52% who think that judges mostly work under the legislation. In opposition to them, there is over 35% of citizens that think judges mostly do not work under the legislation, with over 6% of those who say that judges almost never work under the legislation. This aspect, as research finding, is very indicative, rather, **in great mesure in public exist belief that judges do not work under the legisaltion, but under some other, personal, political, interest criteria.**

Fig 29. Generally speaking, when judges do their work, to what extent they do that in accordance to the Law and regulations and not some other personal, political, interest or any other criteria? %




Consequently, since a large number of citizens think that judges more-less do not work in accordance to the Law, we wanted to know what are the reasons for that (Fig 30 and Fig 31). There are three key reasons by citizens's opinion, first, politics and political pressure on judges, second, using connections and acquaintances as way of pressure on judges, and third, corruption and bribe. To great extent, as reason, they mention personal attitude of judges and their incompetency, while working conditions are not such important reason.

Fig 30. If they Do Not work under the legislation, what are the reasons? %


	Key reason	Important reason	More not that it is a reason	Not reason
Politics and political pressures	50,4	40,3	6,9	2,3
Friendship and relations	42,2	47,5	7,3	3,0
Bribe, corruption and other things Judge has personal benefit	43,0	41,5	11,9	3,6
Personal attitude of the judge about some issue (prejudice)	9,8	23,0	41,0	26,3
Incompetence (lack of knowledge) of judges	6,0	22,6	28,5	42,9
Bad objective conditions judges are work under (buildings, offices, computers, etc.)	4,7	6,9	15,8	72,6

Fig 31. Of they Do Not work under legislation, what are the reasons? – SUM % key and important reason



The question about leality of the courts as institutions is not just a question of work of judges, but also administration. This was the reason to include in research the attitudes of citizens when it comes about their assess how much administrative staff work under legislation (Fig 32). Although in this regard a large number of citizens point out that administrative staff do not work under legislation, key finding is that, by their opinions, the work of administration is in great measure in accordance with law, comparing the work of judges. Rather, almost $\frac{3}{4}$ of citizens think that administration in courts work under legislation, in opposition to 1/3 that think opposite.

Fig 32. When it comes about administrative staff, and if they work under legislation, and not some other, personal, political, interest criteria




When it comes about opinion of respondents about reasons of illegal conduct of administration staff, the three key reasons are the same as at judges, politics, nepotism and corruption, but nepotism is pointed out as the most important reason. However, comparing to judges, when it comes about administration, as more important is assessed the problem of prejudices and incompetency, and objective conditions administration is work under (Fig 33 and Fig 34)

Fig 33. If administrative staff do not work under legislation, what are the reasons? %

	Key reason	Important reason	More not than it is a reason	Not reason
Politics and political pressure	43,1	41,6	10,0	5,3
Friendship and relations	42,9	50,2	4,2	2,7
Bribe, corruption and other things for personal gain	41,3	44,7	9,0	5,0
Personal attitude about some issue (prejudice)	10,3	30,1	36,1	23,5
Incompetence (lack of knowledge)	11,9	27,2	28,6	32,3
Bad objective conditions for work (buildings, offices , computers, etc.)	6,3	10,6	19,5	63,6

Fig 34. If administrative staff do not work under legislative, what are the reasons? – SUM % key and important reason



When it comes about judiciary system, we paid special attention to the way that civil and criminal proceeding works. In this regard, the research is designed to provide insight in very process and cases of eventual corruption.

First, when it comes about litigation, the results (Fig 35) points out that 8% of citizens of Montenegro had experience with civil litigation in the last three years, whether personally or some member of their family had experience. In over 40% of cases of those that had experience, it was about proprietary process, every fifth respondent from those that had experiences filed a lawsuit on the basis of unfulfilled rights, and over 14% was in process because of debt collection (Fig 36). The rest of citizens were in litigation process because of divorce (7,4%), problems with relationships (5,4%), heritage (4,3%), infringement procedure (3%).

Fig 35. Did you or members of your family had experiences with civil litigations in the last three year?






Fig 36. The type of experience with civil litigation %




When it comes about information about litigation (Fig 37), the largest number of respondents who had experience with litigation, information gets through post office (59%), while less than 1/3 gets information from judge, means authorized officer of the court.

Fig 37. In what way you got information about schedule of hearing in court? %




The documentation related to the litigation, citizens, means their lawyers, got mainly from post office (53,7%). By personal delivery from post office, documentation got ¼ of citizens, while 1/5 of citizens got documentation directly in the court (Fig 38)

Fig 38. In what way you got information related to your case? %




The largest number of citizens which had experience with litigation points out that they had trial according to time schedule (52,4%), while every fourth citizen mostly did not have trial according to schedule. On extremes, every tenth citizen points out that time schedule was absolutely respected, and something over that (over 11%) says that schedule was not respected (Fig 39).

Fig 39. Do you think that in this case the court was working according to time schedule? %




On explicit question did someone ask for money or something else, so the litigation would be resolved in their favor, 70% of respondents claim that nobody asked for anything, and that all was as usual. But 11.7% of respondents say that nobody asked for anything, but they think it would be easier for them to get the case if they offered the money. Those who says that someone ask for money from them, but not directly, was 6.6%, while only one respondent (0.6%) claim that someone asked for money directly. The data are not worrying, but they are indicative, especially because of the fact that 11,1% of those who participated in litigation do not want to answer on this question (Fig 40)

Fig 40. Did someone asked for money, favor or something else, so the case would be resolved in your favor?




When it comes about outcome of the trial, the largest number of respondents in our research, which participated in some litigation, resolved the case in their favor (41%), while only 16% lost the case, and 43% of respondents whose process is still ongoing.

Fig 41 What was the outcome of the trial?




Especially interesting is distribution of answers on previous question, means did someone ask from them something so the case would be resolved in their favor. If we compare only two categories, means those who won and those who lost the litigation (Fig 42), it is very interesting that significantly is larger number of those who claims that money was asked from them in cases when they lost the litigation, instead of cases when they won the litigation. Disproportion in this regard also exists when it comes about assessment if it would be easier for them to win the litigation, if they offered the money during the litigation. This data is indicative and can have two possible interpretations. First, it is possible that negative outcome of the litigation citizens that lost litigation interpreting in way that maybe other side won the litigation because it 'bribed' someone, or, second, it is possible that this is just the way to express dissatisfaction because of the outcome of the litigation.

Fig 42. Did someone asked for money from them, considering the outcome of the litigation




Further, by the same pattern, when it comes about litigation, we treated criminal proceedings. Considering that criminal proceedings, comparing to overall population, are not that common, it is understandable that we included in research relatively small number of respondents that had experience in criminal proceedings (Fig 43).

Fig 43. Did you or members of your family had experience with criminal cases in the court in the last three years? %




The very criminal proceeding, from those respondents who had experience, in the largest number of the cases was connected to violent behavior (37,4%) and for traffic violations with serious consequences (29,3%). Smaller number of cases is connected to stealing and financial malfeasance (8,2%), possession and/ or distribution of drugs (7.1), and abuse of official position (3,1%). In 12% of cases, the range of acts was so wide, so it was impossible to categorize it (Fig 44).

Fig 44. Experience in criminal proceedings %




Further, in almost 60% of cases, information about time schedule of hearing, the respondents who had experience in criminal proceedings, got from post office, and almost 29% of cases got it directly from judge or authorized officials. Notice board as a way of informing in this regard is not so significant (Fig 45)

Fig 45. In what way you got information about the schedule of hearing? %




And when it comes about getting documentation about trial, in the most cases citizens, means their lawyers, got information from post office (47,4%), and every fourth citizen got documentation directly in the court, and almost the same number got documentation by personal delivery on home address (Fig 46)

Fig 46. In what way you or your lawyer got documentation for your case? %




Every second respondent with experience in criminal proceedings claim that court mostly worked according to time schedule, while more than every fifth claim that was not the case. That court absolutely respected the time schedule claims over 17% of respondents, while over 11% of respondents claim that court did not respected the time schedule at all (Fig 47).

Fig 47. Do you think that court work according to time schedule in this case? %




On question did someone asked them for money, so the outcome of trial would be in their favor (Fig 48), 81% of respondents answered negatively, and claim that everything was as usual. On the other side, 8,2% of respondents claim that nobody asked for nothing, but believes that if they offered the money, the case would be easier resolved in their favor, while only 1,3% claim that somebody indirectly asked for money. However, we should keep in mind that almost every tenth respondent didn't want to answer on this question, and stays open what are the reasons not to give explicit answer.

Fig 48. Did someone ask you for money, favor or something else, so the case would be resolved in your favor? %



When they were asked about outcome of litigation (Fig 49), it is interesting that there is no big difference between those who won and lost the case. As opposed to litigation, there are no statistically significant differences between those that won or lost the case in terms whether somebody asked them for money for positive outcome.

Fig 49. What was the outcome of litigation? %




Issuance of building permits, participation in tenders and experiences with inspection procedures

This part of research was dedicated to experiences of citizens with procedures of issuance of building permits, their participation in tenders and inspection procedures of state authorities. For this purpose, we made identical methodological platform with referent battery of questions that we applied on these three aspects. This battery was designed to deeply and comprehensively explore not attitudes, but experiences of citizens in aspects we mentioned above.


First, when it comes about procedure of issuance of building permits, 2% of our respondents personally had that experience, with 2% of those whose members of families had those experiences. In addition, 4% of respondents claim that friend/acquaintance had experience with building permits (Fig 50).

Fig 50. Did you or members of your family, or someone you know good, in the last two years had experience with issuance of building permits? %




When it comes about experience with issue building permits, in general, it is rated as mostly positive in almost 60% of cases, and mostly negative in almost 30% of cases. Further, 11,7% of respondents experienced the procedure of issuance of permitis as negative, and less than 3% rated that experience as very positive (Fig 51).

Fig 51. In general, how would you assess that experience? %




In the procedure of issuance of building permits of those who had this kind of experience and feel dissatisfaction with that process, those 38,8% as reason for dissatisfaction mention slowness, tardiness, careless and arbitrary of employees in charge for issuance of permits. Every forth, so, significant number, points out he/she had experience with corruption, bribe and nepotism (or claim that was the right way to get permit). On political incompetency and political discrimination are complaining those 17,6%, while 8,3% express dissatisfaction through attitude that employees in charge for that are unprofessional and incompetent (Fig 52). So, as in previous cases, when it comes about dissatisfaction, it is dominantly because of human factor.

Fig 52. The reasons for negative experience in procedure of issuance of building permit %




The citizens that were in the procedure of getting building permit assess that information about what you need to get permit got more-less without problems. (57,1%). With them, we measure 11,3% of those who says that they got information very easily. However, almost 29% of them claim they got information pretty much difficult, with 3% of those who claim they got information very difficult (Fig 53).

Fig 53. How did you get information about what you need for issuance of building permit? %




In assessment of efficiency of services that are in charge for issuance of building permits, over 56% of respondent assess they were mostly efficient with 2,4% of those who say that services were very efficient. On the other side, over 1/3 off respondent assess that services were mostly inefficient, with over 7% of those that think that services were very inefficient (Fig 54).

Fig 54. How would you assess the efficiency of competent services in very process of issuance of building permits? %




Dealing with aspect of transparency in procedure of getting building permit, our respondents answered on question did someone explained to them the way of getting permit? Over 53% of citizens point out they mostly got explanations in this regard, with 8,8% that point out they got full explanation. On the other side, over 30% of citizens point out they mostly did not get all explanations, with 7,7% that point out they did not get any explanations (Fig 55).

Fig 55. Did someone from competent services explained to you the way of making decisions in process of getting building permit ?




When they were asked about period they needed to get building permit, it is equal number of those who says they got it more-less fast (36,1%) and those who say they waited for long time (35%). Every fifth citizen did not get permit, and only 7,9% assess that getting permit takes very little time (Fig 56)

Fig 56 How much time you needed for getting building permit? %




When they were asked did someone asked them for money, favor or something else to get permit, almost 47% claim that nobody asked for nothing and all was as usual. Those 15,6% say nobody asked for nothing but they think it would be easier t get permit if they offered something. In 6.5% of cases, respondents point out that they were asked for money or something else. However, the data that even 31% of respondents do not want to answer on this question is very indicate, and it stays open what are the reason for them not to answer (Fig 57). From those who say that they were asked for something, only three of them explicitly answered that they were asked for money, one that he was asked directly, one that was asked indirectly, and one who said that inspector tried to blackmail him, and he was asked for money after some time.

Fig 57. Did someone from employees asked you for money, favor or something else, so you could get building permit?




The second part of this part of research, as we said above, was about experiences of citizens with tenders. Considering the fact that this type of experience is not that common for citizens, it was expected that largest number of citizens, in our case, almost 95% did not have such an experience (Fig 58). Therefore, in further dealing with experiences in tenders, we operate with relatively small number of respondents, those 95, which partially limiting the possibilities for better analysis.

Fig 58. Did you, members of your family or someone you know well, in the last two years, had expiriences with participation in tenders? %




From those who had experiences with tenders, 58,8% of them assess that experience as mostly positive, with 12,4% of those who think about that experience as very positive. That experience was more-less negative point out 28,7% of respondents (Fig 59). **From those who say that they had negative experience, as main and only reason for that opinion is, as they say, rigging the tenders.**

Fig 59. How would you rate that experience, in general %




When it comes about getting relevant information about tender, almost 62% of citizens claim they got what they need for application more-less without problems, with 28% of those that say they got all the information very easily. On the other side, every tenth respondent that participated in tender said he got information more-less with difficulties. (Fig 60).

Fig 60. How did you get information about what you need for participation in tender? %




Further, almost 57% of respondents who had experience with tenders assess the work of competent services as mostly efficient, with every fifth respondent who says that services were very efficient. However, also every fifth citizen think that services were mostly inefficient in this regard, with 3,3% of those who think that services were very inefficient. (Fig 61).

Fig 61. How would you assess the efficiency of competent services in tender proceeding %




That someone explained to them the way of making decisions about tender claims 55,7% of respondents, with more than every fifth who claim to got all necessary explanations. On the other side, cumulatively, less than ¼ of respondents claim that mostly or not at all got necessary explanations about decision making in tender (Fig 62).

Fig 62. Did someone from competent services explained to you the way of decision making in tender process? %




The largest number of respondents that participated in tender said they got tender decision more-less fast (67,1%), with those 13,5% who says that it took a very little time. Those 16,7% point out they waited for a long time, while 2,8% says they didn't get information about the results of tender they participated (Fig 63)

Fig 63. How much time you waited for decision who got the tender? %




On explicit question did someone ask them for money or something else, so they could get tender, 46% of respondent claim nobody asked for nothing, but almost 40% 'do not want to answer' on this question, which is very indicative data. Those 8,6% says that nobody asked for nothing, but they are convinced they would got tender if they offered something. Finally, 5,9% of respondent claim that someone asked for something very explicitly, so they could get tender (Fig 64). From those six who claim that someone asked them for something, four says it was the money, and two that it was favor and material thing. Further, one of them say it was directly, and other through mutual friend in the very beginning of tender process.

Fig 64. Did someone from employees asked for money, favor or something else, so you could get tender?%




Third part of this part of research was about experiences of citizens with inspection procedures from state authorities. First, 90% of respondents did not have this kind of experience, and from the rest 10% of respondents, the 4% had personal experience, while 2% had that experience through the member of family, with 4% of those who had this kind of experience through friend/acquaintance (Fig 65)

Fig 65. Did you, member of your family, or someone you know well in the last two years had experience with inspection from state authorities? %




In general assessment of experience with inspection, over 55% of respondent claim that experience was mostly positive, with 6,7% of those who point out that experience was very positive. On the other side, as mostly negative, said almost 29% of respondents, and every tenth point out that experience with inspection was very negative (Fig 66)

Fig 66. How would you rate that experience,in general %




The biggest number of those that are not satisfied with work of inspection, the reason for that see in way that inspector behave (34,2%). Every fourth is unsatisfied due to results of inspection, 16,4% claim there was political pressure or discrimination, while 14% is complaining on corruption, bribe and nepotism. On incompetence and unprofessionalism point out 5,8% of respondents (Fig 67). So, in this regard, too, behavior of competent people is the biggest problem.

Fig 67. The reasons for negative experience %




The biggest number of those who have experience with inspection (over 52%) claim that information about inspectional procedure got more-less without problems, with 18,3% of those that point out they got relevant information very easy. Every fourth claims that he got information pretty much difficult, and almost every twentieth that he got information with a lot of difficulties (Fig 68).

Fig 68. How did you got information about functioning of state inspections? %




That inspectors worked mostly efficient claim 52,7% of respondent, with every tenth who point out that their work was very efficient. But, from the other side, 28,5% of respondents says that inspectors were mostly inefficient, with every tenth who says they were very inefficient (Fig 69).

Fig 69. How would you assess the efficiency of competent services in very process of inspection? %




When it comes about decisions related to inspection, over 47% of respondents assess that they mostly got explanation of the way that making decisions works, with 11,5% that say that they got full explanation. However, every fourth respondent claim that he got incomplete explanation about decision making, with over 16% of respondents who claims that in this regard, they did not get any explanations (Fig 70).

Fig 70. Did someone explained the way of decision making in competent services about inspection process? %




That decision of inspection was made more-less fast says over 53% of respondents, with 22,5% of those who says that decision was made very fast. On the other side, cumulatively, dissatisfaction in this regard expresses every fifth respondent, where every twentieth did not get information about inspection findings (Fig 71).

Fig 71. How much time was needed to get findings and decision from inspection? %



Further, ¼ of respondents claim that nobody asked for anything from them so the finding would be in accordance with their need, while over 16% point out that nobody asked nothing, but if they offered something, they would get favorable findings. But, every tenth respondent that had experience with inspection claim that he was asked to give something to get positive finding. However, from 13 that specified for what they were asked, 8 say favors, 4 says money and one says material things. Finally, only four answered that they were directly asked from the inspector (Fig 72).

Fig 72. Did someone asked you for money, favor or something else so the inspection finding would be in accordance with your need? %




Attitudes, perception and experiences of corruption

The last part of our research was about the problem of corruption. In this part, we measured perception, but besides that, there was a set of questions that suppose to show us the origin of attitudes, and certain experiences that respondents had, when it comes about corruption.


First, we asked citizens how much is corruption, as problem, present in Montenegro (Fig 73). The results shows that big number of respondents thinks that corruption is serious problem, and that is it 'present' think over 36% with almost 32% who point out that is about 'very' present problem. Those 14,7% cannot assess, and over 13% think that corruption is not that present problem, while only 4% think that corruption is present very little. So, when it comes about beliefs, citizens in great measure think that corruption is very present in Montenegro, and as such, represent a serious problem (Fig 73).

Fig 73. How much is corruptionas problem present in Montenegro? %




Particularly we wanted to know the assessment of state of corruption in public services (Fig 74). That only few employees are doing that think over 38% of respondents, but 31,5% of them think that a large number of employees are doing that. Additionally, 7,4% of respondents think that almost all public employees are dealing with corruption, and that almost none of public employees take bribe think only 2,6% of respondents. According to that, there are beliefs in public that corruption is very present in public service.

Fig 74. How much are, by your opinion,present the problems of corruption and bribe in public services? %




Attitude that corruption is present in public services is in great measure based on experiences of people that citizens trust to (Fig 75). In other words, informal way of communication is very important when it comes about forming the attitudes about corruption. This is supported by the fact that the other source of this attitude is what is said in general about public officials. Further, media are also very important for forming the attitude, and comparatively, personal experience is the smallest factor that generates the attitude about corruption in public services. But, although personal experience in this competition has the lowest importance for forming the attitude, we should point out that over 1/3 of citizens their attitude about corruption form on the base of personal experience, which is certainly significant number.

Fig 75. The attitude that corruption is present in public services is based on: % YES answers



When it comes about beliefs (Fig 76), more than every second citizen believe that you should offer something to doctors, and this is comparatively the biggest value that we measure. Then follows custom (44,1%) with inspectors and inspection services (42,3%), police officers (41%), judges and court officials (38,5%), employees in municipal services (32,4%) and tax officials (30,6%). To a lesser extent exist belief that something must be offered to employees in ministries (23,4%), members of municipal councils (18,7%), teachers and professors (18,4%) and finally MPs in the national assembly (15,9%).

Fig 76. Is it possible that someone have to offer the money, gift or favor to the officials bellow, so they should do what they are suppose to do anyway? - % PROBABLY YES answers




Citizens identifies two key reasons for inefficient fight against corruption (Fig 77.1 and Fig 77.2) and they are inefficient fight against corruption from competent institutions (60,9%) and unwillingness of citizens to fight against corruption (60,5%). Further, 56,7% think that it is about habits, 55,2% that it is inefficiency of courts, while 54,1% think it is about the lack of political willingness. Finally, as lesser, but still significant reasons for inefficiency of fight against corruption are lack of legislation (46,3%) complexity of administrative and other procedures (31,4%).

Fig 77.1 How much the following reasons influence on existence of corruption in Montenegro? %

Reasons	One of the key reasons	Very important reason	More not than it is a reason	Not a reason	I don't know
Lack of legislation	19,5	26,8	15,1	14,5	24,1
Inefficient fight against corruption by the police	27,2	33,7	8,5	7,8	22,8
Inefficient judiciary	22,3	32,9	13,1	8,7	23,0
Lack of political will	25,2	28,9	11,4	8,6	25,9
Complexity of administrative and other procedures	9,5	21,9	16,8	17,5	34,4
Unwillingness of citizens to fight against corruption	28,8	31,7	7,7	11,6	20,2
Habits	24,7	32,0	7,7	11,2	24,4


Fig 77.2 The reasons for existence of corruption – SUM key and important reason %



In the following part of this research, we took one step forward and asked respondents did they or members of their families had experience when it comes about corruption in several areas of social life.


First, during assessment and payment of taxes (Fig 78), over ¾ of respondents claim they didn't have such experience, 4% of citizens claim that they had such experience, using connections, with 1,7% of those who used money and gifts.

Fig 78. Experience with corruption during assessing and paying the tax %




That they had experience with corruption in procedures for public adds through the use of connections, positively answered 1,5% of respondents, with 0,6% of those who says that they were giving the money (Fig 79)

Fig 79. Experience with corruption during offering in public adds procedures %




Significantly is bigger number of respondents who claims that they were using connections in procedures for eligibility for pension, different types of help and fees (8,4%), with 2,5% of those who claims that they gave money for this purpose. (Fig 80)

Fig 80. Experience with corruption in getting right to pension, or different types of help, or fee for unemployed %




In custom procedures 4,4% of respondents were using connections, while in giving the money and gifts participated 3,2% (Fig 81)

Fig 81. Experience with corruption in custom procedure %




In procedures in court, connection used 4,8% of citizens, while money or gifts, as way to affect on decision of the court, used 1,5% of respondents (Fig 82).

Fig 82. Experience with corruption in court procedures %




Comparatively is significantly higher percent of those who used connections to influence on work of municipal government for their interest (12,5%), with 1,7% who gave money or gifts (Fig 83).

Fig 83. Experience with corruption in procedures with municipal government (issuance of permits, certificates, decisions in local self-government %




In procedures of inspection services, 4,9% of respondents used connections, and money and gifts used 2,6% of respondents (Fig 84)

Fig 84. Experience with corruption in procedures of inspection services %




In final part of research we asked several questions about perception of corruption and its and value relation. First, we asked question of guilt of actors in corruption (Fig 85). In this regard, 52% of respondent finds equally guilty both, the one who gives bribe and the one that takes bribe. However, interesting is that there is significantly larger number of those who think that the one who is guilty is the one that takes bribe (34%) comparing to number of those who think that the one who is guilt is the one that gives bribe (9%). About this question, 5% of respondents don't have attitude.

Fig 85. Who is, by your opinion, more guilt – one that gives bribe or one that takes bribe? %




We also explored the action potential in situations when citizens know about cases of corruption (Fig 86). Relatively big number of respondents points out that they would report the case of corruption if they would know about it (36%), while 29% points out that they would not report it.

Fig 86. Would you report the case of corruption if you would know about it? %




From those who says they would report the case of corruption if they would know about it, 1/3 would report it to police and to directorate for anticorruption initiative, and these two are key institutions that citizens see as key in fight against corruption. Further, 8,7% of respondents would report the case of corruption to NGOs, 7,4% to state prosecutor, 6,9% to media, and 4,3% to court (Fig 87).

Fig 87. To whom would you report the case of corruption %




On the other side, we were very interested in reasons not to report the case of corruption (Fig 88). In this regard, it is interesting that is almost equal number of citizens who wouldn't report it because of the fear from the consequences (23,8%), because of difficulty to prove it (22,2%), because of lack of belief that investigation would ever happened (21,8%). Some lower, but still significant is number of citizens 16,7% would not report corruption because of cultural reasons, while every tenth would not report it without saying the reason. Finally, every twentieth citizen would not report corruption because he don't know to whom to report, so the problem of addressing is the smallest problem.

Fig 88. Why WOULDN'T YOU report the corruption %




At the end of research, we measured perception of corruption on scale from 0 (no corruption) to 10 (there is corruption). In Fig 89 is presented mean o this scale. The data shows that the highest degree of perception of corruption is present when it comes about custom, then judiciary, organs of state administration, local authorities, police, prosecution, state services, municipal services and university. We measure lower degree of perception when it comes about sport and media, and the lowest degree of perception of corruption when it comes about high school system, NGOs and primary schools.

Fig 89. INDEX perception of corruption



At the end, we should also keep in mind the trend of perception of corruption (Fig 90), namely, trend is very positive, and on scale from 0 to 10, the mean is today lower for 1,8 index point comparing to february 2008 year. Therefore, it is obvious that all efforts in the last couple of years gave certain results, at least that is the case when it comes about perception of corruption.

Fig 90. INDEX perception of corruption- TREND



Some analytical-synthetic findings important for formulation of public policies

In the final part of this research, we will offer couple important analytical-synthetic views on questions that were subject of our interest with aim to offer certain knowlegde that could be interesting for formulation of public policies. For this purpose, we formed additional synthetic variable that provide us to derive analytics in the following pages. In this regard we ask and give answers on some key questions.

1. *Whether and to what extent confidence in institutions influence on perception of corruption?*

The answer is positive, so, the higher level of confidence in institutions of societies, the lower level of perception of corruption and vice versa (Fig 91). According to that, raising the confidence in institutions could influence on reducing the level of perception of corruption.

Fig 91. Connection between confidence in institutions and Index of perception of corruption

		Index of perception of corruption			Total
		Low level	Middle level	High level	
Confidence in institutions	Low confidence	11,2%	34,2%	54,6%	100,0%
	Middle confidence	37,8%	40,1%	22,2%	100,0%
	High confidence	59,1%	25,2%	15,7%	100,0%

$$\chi^2(df, 4) = 275,8 \quad p < 0.01$$

2. Whether and to what extent political knowledge influence on perception of corruption?

The answer on this question is very indicative and interesting (Fig 92). Namely, the results shows that the higher the level of political knowledge, the lower the level of perception of corruption. In other words, high level of perception of corruption is the result of political ignorance to the great extent, and consequently, by increasing the level of political knowledge, we can expect decreasing of level of perception of corruption.

Fig 92. Connection between political knowledge and Index of perception of corruption

		Index of perception of corruption			Total
		Low level	Middle level	High level	
Political knowledge	Low level	29,6%	31,5%	38,8%	100,0%
	Middle level	30,5%	40,2%	29,3%	100,0%
	High level	34,7%	30,6%	34,7%	100,0%

$$\chi^2(df, 4) = 14,0 \quad p < 0.01$$

3. Whether and to what extent confidence in media influence on perception of corruption?

The answer on this question is negative (Fig 93), namely, we cannot say that higher or lower confidence influence on perception of corruption.

Fig 93. Connection between confidence in media and Index of perception of corruption

		Index of perception of corruption			Total
		Low level	Middle level	High level	
Confidence in media	Low level	29,5%	31,5%	39,0%	100,0%
	Middle level	31,3%	34,5%	34,2%	100,0%
	High level	32,3%	36,7%	31,0%	100,0%

$$\chi^2(df, 4) = 5,8$$

$$p > 0.01$$

4. Whether and to what extent unconventional political participation influence on perception of corruption?

In this regard we identify strong connection between unconventional political participation and perception of corruption (Fig 94). Rather, the higher the level of readiness on unconventional political participation, the higher the level of perception of corruption.

Fig 94. Connection between unconventional political participation and Index of perception of corruption

		Index of perception of corruption			Total
		Low level	Middle level	High level	
Unconventional political participation	Low level	57,8%	27,6%	14,7%	100,0%
	Middle level	38,9%	30,9%	30,2%	100,0%
	High level	20,3%	31,9%	47,8%	100,0%

$$\chi^2(df, 4) = 85,92$$

$$p < 0.01$$

5. Whether and to what extent experience with corruption is connected to high perception of corruption?

The answer is positive, personal experiences with corruption are very clearly connected to perception of corruption (Fig 95)

Fig 95. Connection between experiences with corruption and Index of perception of corruption

		Index of perception of corruption			Total
		Low level	Middle level	High level	
Experience with corruption	Without experience	39,8%	30,6%	29,6%	100,0%
	Little experience	22,5%	40,2%	37,3%	100,0%
	Big experience	7,4%	38,9%	53,7%	100,0%

$\chi^2(df, 4) = 67,9$

$p < 0.01$

Concluding observations

- The confidence in institutions in Montenegro is on 'middle' level. Judiciary, public services and local self-government are in the 'lower' part from the aspect of confidence compared to other institutions.
- In communication with ministries, the largest number of citizens had experience with Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, Ministry of Internal affairs, Ministry of Tourism and Ministry of Finance.
- Equal number of citizens evaluates that ministries are efficient, means inefficient.
- The highest degree of inefficiency in communication with citizens, ministries shows when it comes about resolving complaints and objections and requests for certain rights.
- As key reasons for inefficiency of ministries is identified slowness, tardiness, careless, arbitrary, corruption, bribe and nepotism, then unprofessional, irresponsibility, incompetency and political discrimination.
- When it comes about communication with organs of local self-government, almost half of citizens express dissatisfaction regarding the procedures and ways their case was solved, and similar is when it comes about efficiency of work of local self-government.
- Similarly, when it comes about ministries and judiciary, as key reason for inefficiency is slowness, tardiness, careless, and arbitrary. Then we have unprofessionalism, incompetency, corruption, bribe and nepotism, and politicization of work of organs of local self-government.
- Unlike previous years, today in Montenegro, we measure higher level of unconventional political participation, rather, readiness to take over certain unconventional actions to gain certain rights

- Every tenth citizen would not have filed suit to authorities if his/her rights were endangered, and as a reason they mention distrust in judiciary, and institutions in society, or some personal reasons
- More than every tenth citizen did not or they would not use the Law on free access to information as the way to protect their rights. As reason they mention personal reasons and mistrust in institutions.
- In communication with courts, the most common is contact with Basic courts
- Cumulative, 1/3 of citizens did not have satisfactory insight in ways and procedures of resolving their cases
- Almost every second citizen has negative attitude about judiciary and its speed and efficiency, almost every second citizen is not satisfied with efficiency of courts.
- Key factor for inefficiency (every second citizen mention this factor), is arbitrary, slowness, tardiness, careless of employees in judiciary. Then, corruption, bribe, and nepotism, incompetency, and irresponsibility and politicization in the work of courts
- Significant number of citizens thinks that judges do not judge by the law, but by certain political, personal and other criteria.
- Key factors that endanger legality of judges and judiciary in general are politics and political pressures, nepotism and corruption.
- When it comes about civil litigations, these litigations are, in the largest number of cases, due to proprietary processes and suits because of unclaimed rights.
- The main channel of informing in litigations is 'post office', so as information got from judges.
- When they get documentation, post office, home delivery, and giving information in very process are way of procedure.
- Significant number of citizens points out that Court in litigation did not work according to time schedule.
- Every fifth citizen claims that he/her was asked for money during litigation, or he was convinced that if he/her offered money, the case would be resolved in its favor. Additionally, over 11% of citizen did not want to answer on this question. According to this, real or potential around 30% of litigations is in the zone of corruption. However, it is interesting that attitudes about corruption in litigations are much more present with citizens that lost cases than with those that lost it. That potentially tells us that dissatisfaction due to losing of litigation can be deciphered from respondents by their conviction that it is about corruption, or that corruption was inside the litigation.
- When it comes about criminal proceedings, the largest number of citizens who had this experience was in criminal proceeding due to violent behavior or difficult traffic accidents.
- During the procedure, most of the times, they got information from post office and employees in courts.
- Every third citizen thinks that in criminal proceeding Court did not work according to time schedule.
- When it comes about criminal proceedings, potentially 20% of cases are in the zone of corruption, and very small number of citizens talks about that, most of them say they could influence on case if they offered the money, with large number of those who refuse to talk about it.

- Over 40% of citizens negatively evaluates the experience in process of getting building permit (of course, from those who had that experience)
- In this, like in previous cases, the key reason for dissatisfaction is assessment of citizens that officials are acting slowly, tardy, careless and arbitrary. Second reason is corruption/bribe/nepotism, and third conviction that in getting building permit is involved political discriminative criteria. In this regard, unlike previous cases, comparatively is smaller number of citizens who complains on unprofessionalism and incompetency of employees.
- Almost 1/3 of citizens claims that more-less they had problem to get the information about getting building permit, and over 40% think that services are not efficient in procedure of issuance of permits (35% says they waited for long to get permit), and over 37% point out they didn't get explanations about procedure of getting building permit.
- When it comes about issuance of building permit, comparatively, we measure the highest degree of potential corruption, namely, more than every fifth citizen say he was asked to give something to get permit, or he was convinced that he would get permit more easily. But, the most indicative data is that over 30% of citizens that were in the procedure of getting permit do not want to answer on this question.
- From all interviewed citizens that had experience with tenders, less than 30% express dissatisfaction, but in this regard, it is indicative that as a reason for dissatisfaction there is only one reason, and that is 'rigging' the tenders. The data that additionally points out on the problem of corruption in this area is that every sixth respondent claims that he was asked for something to get the tender or that he would get it easier if he offered something, but especially is important data that almost 40% of respondent did not want to answer on this question.
- In this regard, comparatively to other procedures that we examined, getting the information and efficiency of competent services is smaller problem.
- In the procedure of issuance of building permits, around 40% of respondents, by their experience, had negative experience, and as a key reason of dissatisfaction they points out the way inspector behave, while every third express dissatisfaction because of inspection findings. In over 16% of cases, they claim that it was about corruption, while 14% their problem identifies with political pressures and political discrimination.
- Almost 30% of citizens express dissatisfaction in regard of getting information about how does the inspection bodies work, while almost 40% negatively evaluates the efficiency of work of inspection bodies, and further, over 40% points out they did not get the explanation about the way the inspection bodies works and make decisions.
- Every tenth citizen who had experience with inspection claims he was asked for something so he could get positive finding, with over 16% of those that believe they would get favorable findings if they offered something.
- By analysis of corruption we determined that citizens in Montenegro thinks there is a high level of corruption, and when it comes about public services, 40% of citizens thinks that cases of corruption are very spread.
- High perception of corruption in Montenegro is not just the result of public political discourses, rather, 2/3 of citizens build their attitude about corruption based on experiences of people they know (again the importance of informal communication) **and every third citizen had similar experience with corruption**

- Observed by the type of work that public officials do, citizens believe that corruption is the most present when it comes about doctors and health care workers (every second citizens), then custom officials, inspectors, police officers, judges and court officials.
- By opinion of citizens, for efficient fight against corruption it is necessary: for official state representatives to be efficient, for all citizens to be active in fight against corruption. The large number of citizen points out that reason for corruption is actually question of 'force of habit' (the problem of legitimization of corruption). For inefficient fight against corruption are also responsible inefficiency of judiciary and lack of political will.
- When it comes about civil potential for reporting the corruption, almost 30% of citizens are not ready to report the case of corruption if they would know about it, and as reasons they mention the fear from consequences, distrust in institutions, and problems in proving the corruption.